शनिवार, 27 मार्च 2010

112. Jurisdiction of BFIR vis a vis High Court

Sick Industrial Companies (Special provisions) Act, 1984 (SICA) has overriding effect when there arises a question of jurisdiction of BFIR under SICA vis a vis the High Court under s 391 of companies Act.
In Tata Motors Ltd v. Pharmaceutical Products of India Ltd. & Anr
2008 AIR 2805, 2008(9 )SCR267 , 2008(7 )SCC619 , 2008(9 )SCALE262 , 2008(9 )JT227, the respondent being unable to pay the dues made a reference in terms of Section 15 of SICA before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). The BIFR passed an order recommending winding up of the respondent. An appeal was preferred there against before the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR).

Respondent, however, filed an application before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay purported to be in terms of Section 391 of the 1956 Act during the pendency of the said appeal. Scheme proposed by the respondent was approved by the single judge as well as in intra court appeal .

The Supreme Court held that:

‘SICA furthermore was enacted to secure the principles specified in Article 39 of the Constitution of India. It seeks to give effect to the larger public interest. It should be given primacy because of its higher public purpose. Section 26 of SICA bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.

What scheme should be prepared by the operating agency for revival and rehabilitation of the sick industrial company is within the domain of BIFR. Section 26 not only covers orders passed under SICA but also any matter which BIFR is empowered to determine.
The jurisdiction of civil court is, thus, barred in respect of any matter for which the appellate authority or the Board is empowered. The High Court may not be a civil court but its jurisdiction in a case of this nature is limited. Section 15 of SICA provides for making reference by the Board of Directors of the Company on becoming an industrial company, a sick industrial company, to the Board for determination of the measures to be adopted with respect to the company. Section 16 provides for making inquiry into the working of sick industrial company by the Board after receiving reference.

Section 17 of SICA provides for powers of Board to make suitable order on the completion of inquiry. Section 18 thereof provides for preparation and sanction of Scheme. Section 19 provides for rehabilitation by giving financial
assistance. According to sub section (1), Where the scheme relates to preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures with respect to any sick industrial
company, the scheme may provide for financial assistance by way of loans, advances or guarantees or reliefs or concessions or sacrifices from the Central Government, a State Government, any scheduled bank or other bank, a public financia institution or State level institution or any institution or other authority (any Government, bank, institution or other authority required by a scheme to provide for such financial assistance being hereafter in this section referred to as the person required by the scheme to provide financial assistance) to the sick industrial company.

The supreme court held that :
“The provisions of a special Act will override the provisions of a general Act. A later of it will override an earlier Act. 1956 Act is a general Act. It consolidates and restates the law relating to companies and certain other associations. It is prior in point of time to SICA.
……… Wherever any inconstancy is seen in the provisions of the two Acts, SICA would prevail. SICA furthermore is a complete code. It contains a non-obstante clause in Section 32.
……..SICA is a special statute. It is a self contained Code. The jurisdiction of the Company Judge in a case where reference had been made to BIFR would be subject to the provisions of SICA.”


In NGEF Ltd. vs. Chandra Developers (P) Ltd. : (2005) 8 SCC 219 (see also, Morgan Securities and Credit Pvt. Ltd. v. Modi Rubber Ltd. [AIR 2007 SC 683), in regard to the jurisdiction of the Company Court it was held :-
"39. The provisions of SICA contain non obstante clauses. It is a special statute. It is a complete code in itself. The jurisdiction of the Company Court in such matters would arise only when BIFR or AAAIFR, as the case may be, has exercised its jurisdiction under Section 20 of SICA recommending winding up of the Company upon arriving at a finding that there does not exist any chance of revival of the Company."

It was further held:
The satisfaction arrived at by BIFR that the Company is not likely to become viable in future and it is just and equitable that the Company should be wound up must be based on objective criteria. The High Court indisputably on receipt of such recommendation of BIFR would initiate a proceeding for winding up in terms of
Section 433 of the Companies Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 536 ipso facto does not confer any jurisdiction upon the Company Court to direct sale of the assets of the sick company. It has to exercise its power thereunder subject to the provisions of the special statute governing the field. Despite the fact that the procedures laid down under the Companies Act would be applicable therefore but they must be read with sub-section (4) of Section 20 of SICA which contains a non obstante clause and in
terms thereof, BIFR is authorised to sell the assets of the sick industrial company in such a manner as it may dee fit. By reason of the said provision, BIFR is also empowered to forward the sale proceeds to the High Court for orders for distribution in accordance with Section 529-A and other provisions of the Companies Act which in no uncertain terms would mean that the distribution of the sale proceeds would be for the purpose of meeting the claims of the creditors in the manner laid down therein. The intention of Parliament in enacting the said provision becomes clear as in terms of Section 22-A of SICA, BIFR is empowered to issue any direction in the interest of the sick industrial company or its creditors or shareholders and direct the sick industrial company not to dispose of its assets except with its assent. Section 32, contains a non obstante clause. The scheme suggests that BIFR retains control over the assets of the Company and in terms of the aforementioned provisions may either sick industrial company. Such a power in BIFR remains till a winding-up order is passed by the High Court and a stage arrives for the High Court for issuing orders for
distribution of the sale proceeds.
………SICA was furthermore enacted subsequent to the provisions of the Companies Act. It is not, thus, possible to accept the submission that the High Court exercises a concurrent jurisdiction."

It was ruled that the Company Court and the BIFR do not exercise concurrent jurisdiction. It was held that: It may be true that the High Court's jurisdiction is that of the Appellate Authority but keeping in view the terminology contained in sub- section (4) of Section 20 read with Section 32 of the Act, it leaves no manner of doubt that the provisions of SICA shall prevail over the provisions of the Companies Act. For the aforementioned purpose, it was not necessary for Parliament to mention specifically the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 20 that the same shall prevail over Section 536 of the Companies Act…..”

“BIFR admittedly had the power to sell the assets of the Company but the High Court until a winding-up order is issued does not have the same.”

In Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. Bombay Environmental Action
Group : (2006) 3 SCC 434 It was held that:
“13. The 1993 Act was enacted to provide for and regulate the payment of interest on delayed payments to small-scale and ancillary industrial undertakings and for matters connected therewith.
14. The provisions of the 1993 Act, therefore, do not envisage a situation where an industrial company becomes sick and requires framing of a scheme for its revival.
15. It is no doubt true that an award in relation to a claim of a small-scale industry if made by the Council would be governed by the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 .”

In Damji Valli Shah v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, [(1965) 2 SCR 665 ], the question which arose for consideration was as to whether a similar provision made in the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 shall bar the jurisdiction of the Company Court in terms of Section 446 (1) of the Companies Act. Referring to Section 41 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 it was stated that the Tribunal constituted under the LIC Act will have exclusive jurisdiction.

शनिवार, 6 मार्च 2010

111. Cancellation of petrol pump dealership- prier notice of test is mandatory

Case - M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. & Ors v. M/s Super Highway Services & Anr. decided on 19/02/2010


An inspection of petrol pump was made and dealership was cancelled on the ground that high speed diesel was found contaminated. The High allowed the writ petition of the on the ground that notice of the Laboratory Test to be conducted at the Barauni Terminal had not been served upon thepetitioner, which has caused severe prejudice to him since its dealership agreement was terminated on the basis of the findings of such Test. Admittedly the dealership agreement was terminated on the ground that the product supplied by the petitioner corporation was contaminated by the respondent. Such contamination was sought to be proved by testing the T.T. retention sample in the laboratory at Barauni Terminal.

Dismissing the SLP of the Corporation the Supreme Court held that : “The Guidelines being followed by the Corporation require that the dealer should be given prior notice regarding the test so that he or his representative also can be present when the test is conducted. The said requirement is in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the need for fairness in the matter of terminating the dealership agreement and it cannot be made an empty formality. Notice should be served on the dealer sufficiently early so as to give him adequate time and opportunity to arrange for his presence during the test and there should be admissible evidence for such service of notice on the dealer. Strict adherence to the above requirement is essential, in view of the possibility of manipulation in the conduct of the test, if it is conducted behind the back of the dealer. In the present case, there is no admissible evidence to prove service of notice on the respondent or refusal of notice by the respondent. Further, the notice dated 28.05.2008 which was allegedly refused by respondent, did not give him adequate time to arrange for the presence of himself or his representative during the test to be conducted at 3.00 PM on 29.05.2008. It is also to be noted that the endorsement regarding the alleged refusal is dated 29.05.2008 itself. Thus, the termination of the dealership agreement of the respondent was arbitrary, illegal and in violation of the principles of natural justice.”